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26 July 1955

WORLD "BLUEPRINT" REACTION

- I. Within the Communist Bloc, no official Soviet reaction to proposal has been seen.
 - A. Highest-level comment to date came from presidium members Malenkov and Pervukhin during 23 July chat with embassy Counselor Walsley.
 1. In response to prodding by Walsley, the pair said President's proposal "is one of the proposals the Soviet Government will examine attentively," also alluded to Bulganin's opening statement at Geneva as representing USSR's view and inquired US attitude toward Soviet 10 May disarmament proposal.
 2. Although TASS news account of 21 July session included President's proposal, Moscow glossed it over by failing mention either in comment pegged to 21 July session or in subsequent propaganda.
 3. Top Pravda man (Yuri Zhukov) at conference said "We had thought there might be a rabbit in the hat, but we did not expect anything on this scale."
 4. 
European Communist newsmen at Geneva knocked at plan.
 - a. Circulated word that Soviet delegation did not regard plan seriously, but would not reject it outright.

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DOCUMENT NO. 27

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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1990

AUTH: 6870-2

DATE: 15 Jan 80

REVIEWER: 006514

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- b. said USSR would consent to plan's consideration by UN Disarmament Commission, but without expectation it will be implemented.
 - c. Claimed proposal violated principle of national sovereignty.
- D. European Satellite propaganda is following line of "file and forget."
- 1. Example: Czechoslovakia's special correspondent in Geneva (Vladimir Tyl, 22 July): "...Yesterday, President Eisenhower presented another proposal which was not in direct connection with disarmament but which, in author's opinion, can contribute to conviction that US and USSR are seeking reduce danger of another war.

"Although would be unjust doubt Eisenhower's good will to contribute with this proposal to tranquility of public opinion, grave doubts do arise as to possibility of actually doing this because it would violate elementary sovereign rights of each nation.

- 2. East Germany's Geneva commentator (Reinhardt 22 July): "...Eisenhower yesterday submitted, with much rhetoric, a memorandum by which even Western circles were somewhat embarrassed—a memorandum, in the drafting of which he had searched his mind and heart for something that might convince everyone of the sincerity of the United States in the disarmament question.

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"But, unfortunately, Eisenhower did not propose real disarmament and the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons. He demanded only a control, a so-called alarm which by itself, in the way he proposed, would in the final analysis only amount to the registration of an act of aggression at the last minute--- a plan which does not really get down to the heart of the matter.

"Such control could certainly occupy a very important place in a thorough-going system of disarmament, just as the Soviet proposal of 10 May had already stated. But alone, without real measures for disarmament, it just will not suffice."

"If, however, it is to be a first American step and others are to be expected from the Americans, it can nevertheless be a positive linking-up point."

C. Peking's official voice, the People's Daily, on 28 July, does not refer explicitly to the proposal, but observes that Summit "discussions on European security and armaments reduction, in particular, showed that all the participants desired to reach a solution agreeable to all on these two important questions."

1. This following of Pravda's line implies that the Chinese Communists are waiting for word from Moscow before directly commenting on the proposal

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11. European public reaction to the "blueprint" proposal gave it general credit for having improved the atmosphere at Geneva, and its presentation greatly enhanced the President's prestige. However, official reaction to its practicality was varied.

a. UK's Eden, back in London, called it "very imaginative." "But," he added, "there are other offers we have got to examine, and all these can now be taken up and pursued."

1. UK press reaction reflected Eden. On 22 July, the proposal was headlined in all papers except The Daily Worker. Since then, little notice has been taken of it.

b. France's Premier Faure, back in Paris, did not mention the proposal. French press links proposal with Faure's "new idea" (inspection by agent examination): cites both as important psychological gestures and as evidence of West's desire find "practical" solutions to disarmament problem (in contrast with USSR's "theoretical" approach).

1. In IKS interview (26 July) Premier Edgar Faure stated there is a chance for eventual Soviet acceptance of the President's "open skies" proposal because USSR indicated at Geneva that they may now be willing to follow a peaceful path.

c. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in contrast to UK coolness, French disinterest, called proposal "most significant single result of entire conference...one which USSR cannot dodge."

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2. Cool British reception of proposal reflects their own overriding interest in seeking concrete agreements through negotiations with USSR on what UK regards as problems most deserving of solution. (German unity, European security).

1. UK attitude is consistent with Eden's professed desire to seek peace through negotiations on European problems in hope that such a regional settlement might later be extended around world.

2. The French attitude seems to betray awareness that Gaure's own suggestions were neither new, practical nor dramatic.

3. Adenauer's hearty endorsement is consistent with Bonn's pre-conference attitude: that overall settlement of disarmament problem would lead, in turn, to more concrete results of European security and German re-unification.

III. Middle East remained generally unaffected by the "blueprint" proposal.

A. No official reaction from India. Press comments attribute proposal to sincere desire on President's part to lift conference from "well-worn grooves" and inject new spirit into "long drawn-out campaign of attrition." Press speculates that USSR will not reject it outright and pins hope on sincerity of both sides.

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1. Comment reflects position of India, which is desperately seeking to promote world peace. Nehru will almost certainly be encouraged to put pressure on both East and West to continue beginning made at Summit, follow up peaceful declarations with tangible actions. Most Indians will probably feel Nehru has had great deal to do with developing political climate visible at Geneva.

Nehru
Wants
FR summit

2. No reaction yet from Ceylon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, the Arab States, Turkey, Greece or Africa.

IV. In the non-Communist Far East, no reaction yet from any part of Southeast Asia, hearing minor New Zealand press echo of UK line: "a striking gesture." No official comment elsewhere in Far East.

A. Conservative Japanese Asahi (influential daily in Tokyo) states in editorial "... fact that Eisenhower believes that with reason, conscience and mutual trust, the vicious warpath can be domesticated, means beyond doubt that the United States now feels it can trust the Soviet Union. The feeling should be reciprocated."

1. Proposal may initially strengthen Japanese reluctance both to rearm and to permit storage of US atomic weapons in Japan. Strong Soviet rejection might increase Japanese awareness of need to increase own defenses.

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- v. Only comment from Tormosa (where entire conference has been treated as another hand-to-hand battle in a continuing cold war) was a 26 July characterization of the offer by Taipei Radio as a "daring proposal" and one of many moves by the President to maintain the initiative at Geneva.
- g. South Korea's government-sponsored English-language paper, Korean Republic (28 July) made even more self-interested comment: "Perhaps half out of disillusionment and half out of naivete came President Eisenhower's startling proposal," and concluded "As an international negotiator, President Eisenhower is a great soldier."
1. President Rhee fears and opposes any move to reduce tension between the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc, since he believes that his all-consuming goal of Korean unification can be realized only through US war with bloc.

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